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Countering the Plaintiffs Anchor:
Jury Simulations to Evaluate Damages
Arguments
john Campbell, Bernard Chao, Christopher Robertson, & David V Yokum*
ABSTRACT: Numerous studies have shown that the amount of a juror's
damages decision is strongly affected by the number suggested by the plaintiffs
attorney, independent of the strength of the actual evidence (a psychological
effect known as "anchoring"). For scholars and policy makers, this behavior is
worrisome for the legitimacy and accuracy of jury decisions, especially in the
domain of non-economic damages (e.g., pain and suffering). One noted
paper even concluded that "the more you ask for, the more you get." Others
believe that the damage demand must pass the "straight-face" test because
outlandishly high demands will diminish credibility and risk the plaintiff
losing outright.
Can defendants effectively rebut an anchor? One strategy is for defendants to
offer a "counter-anchor"-a much lower proposed damage award than the
plaintiffs. However, defense attorneys worry that juries may interpret such a
strategy as a concession of liability. Based on this fear, some defendants allow
the plaintiffs anchor to go unrebutted. But this strategy, like counter-anchors,
has not been rigorously studied.
To answer these questions, we conducted a randomized controlled experiment
in which we exposed mock jurors to a shortened medical malpractice trial,
manipulated with six different sets of damages arguments in factorial design.

* John Campbell and Bernard Chao share the Hughes-Ruud Research Professorship at the
University of Denver. Professor Campbell is a Lawyering Process Professor at the Sturm College
of Law, University of Denver. Professor Chao is an associate professor at the Sturm College of
Law, University of Denver. Professor Robertson is an associate professor at James E. Rogers
College of Law, University of Arizona. David Yokum graduated from the James E. College of Law
and has a Ph.D. in Psychology from the University of Arizona. Yokum is also a Fellow on the White
House Social & Behavioral Sciences Team.
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